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Being embodied is being able to take risk, 
that is, being open and exposed to the 
unknown. 
 (Depraz 2005, p.173) 
 
Introduction 
Lawrence Shapiro, in his book Embodied Cognition (2010), distinguishes 
three types of relations between standard research on cognition and the 
embodied cognitive science: conceptualization, constitution, and 
replacement. In the first case, our conceptualization of the world is body-
based. In the second case, the body and even some artifacts constitute 
cognition. In the third case, cognition should be explained in terms of 
embodied, ecological dynamical systems. As Shapiro (2010) and other 
commentators point out (e.g. Wilson, Golonka, 2013), only the last one is 
incompatible with research in standard cognitive science, and at the 
same time, it is the only really interesting option. Seven years after the 
publication of this book, it is quite clear that the replacement hypothesis 
is far from being successful (see: Goldinger et al., 2016). And, as noticed, 
even if it succeeds, it often fails to explain phenomena that are 
traditionally called cognitive (Aizawa, 2014; 2015a; 2015b).  
 This paper unfolds the view which integrates a computational 
and embodied approach to cognition (see also: Rupert 2016; Miłkowski 
2016). However, I assume it here without argument. I argued for an 
integration of embodied and computational view on cognition 
somewhere else (Nowakowski, 2017). Still, many authors point out the 
role of action or interaction, body experience, or artifacts in cognition, 
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but more detailed works on internal processing are still rare (however, 
see: Allen, Friston, 2016; Clark, 2013; 2015; Miłkowski, 2016; Rupert, 
2016; de Bruin, Michael, 2017). Therefore, I propose some introductory, 
empirical considerations on internal, cognitive processing in bodily 
cognitive systems.  
 In this paper, I start with remarks on internal, cognitive 
processing. After that, I refer to Alvin Goldman’s moderate approach of 
embodied cognition (highly incompatible with replacement hypothesis). 
Goldman (2012; 2014) considers the crucial role of body representations 
(B-codes) in cognition. So, we can propose some remarks not only on 
internal processing but perhaps also on the role of body representations 
in this processing. 
 After the remarks on Goldman’s approach, I will sketch my own 
approach (E-codes approach), based on some conceptual twists. Crucial 
for embodiment of cognition will be not the role of the body for 
cognition, but—as I will argue— the role of cognition for the body. This 
is nothing new, but sadly it is a still too-often neglected view on this 
matter (but, see: Haselager et al., 2008; Keijzer, 2015). This twist may 
lead to integration between work on embodied cognition and evolution 
of the nervous system. After all, embodied cognitive systems are mainly 
bodily machines, living organisms coping with problems they face in 
their own surroundings. In the view proposed here, E-codes should be 
efficient, robust, and body-specific.1  
 Relating E-codes to Goldman's approach, we can say that the 
central nervous system is undoubtedly an essential part of the system 
responsible for cognitive processing. However, there is a reason to 
believe that such a system can extend beyond the boundaries of the 
brain (see: Nowakowski, 2017; Wilson, 2010). Therefore, we can 
differentiate:   
 B-codes: Body related processing; 
 E-codes: Efficient, robust, and body-specific processing. 
Therefore, we can ask: 
 a. Is it possible that B-codes are E-codes?  
 b. What conditions must be met for B-codes to be a kind of E-
codes? 
                                                 
1 This issue will be elaborated in more detail later in the text.  
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I am strongly convinced and I argue that we should bind E-codes (not 
pure B-codes) with embodied cognition. Therefore, as was mentioned 
earlier, we should not ask what the body does for cognition, but what 
cognition does for the body. Hence, I start with some evolutionary 
considerations on cognition, and then relate this to considerations on the 
role of the body in shaping cognition.  
 
1. The complexity thesis and the internal processing in the 
embodied cognition 
I begin my remarks with cognition, and the body in which cognition is 
embodied, then I move to complexity theses and the work of Keijzer with 
Arnellos (2017, and Keijzer, 2015) on the evolution of cognition 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1996) with more recent works on the evolution of the 
nervous system, and I propose a more internalist view on the evolution 
of cognition. They argue for the important role of both environmental 
and bodily complexity. After that, I turn to initial remarks about internal 
processing in embodied cognition. 
 
1.1 Cognition that is embodied 
For our purposes, we can reuse a part of the title of Aizawa’s paper 
(2015b): “What is this cognition that is supposed to be embodied?” 
There is an ongoing debate both outside and inside the research on 
embodied cognition about what cognition could be. Currently, there is 
strong criticism that in research on embodiment we deal not with 
cognition but behavior misdescribed as cognition (Aizawa, 2014; 2015a; 
2015b). So what is cognition?   
 Here I refer to interesting remarks from Buckner’s (2015) paper. 
He writes:  
 
“[…] cognitive scientists should collect the behaviors that 
they are interested in explaining as the result of cognition. 
They should then theorize about a minimal set of capacities 
that would allow systems to display these behaviors, and see 
whether agents possessing capacities that allow them to 
pass one set of behavioral tests also tend to possess the 
others. If it is plausible that they do, then scientists should 
attempt to develop a model of the underlying mechanisms 
that could produce those capacities and explain why they 
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would tend to cluster together” (Buckner, 2015, pp.310-
311). 
 
Therefore, basic cognition (in our terminology: cognitive processing) is 
realized by a cognitive mechanism. This mechanism gives the system a 
set of capacities for the realization of some cognitive behaviors. 
Behaviors are the effect of employing a cognitive mechanism. In the 
same paper, Buckner (2015) describes cognition as an ecumenical, 
homeostatic cluster of properties such as context sensitivity, fast 
adaptation, grouping/categorization, abstract learning, multi-modality, 
inhibition, and monotonic integration. As far as this is the cluster,  
cognition doesn't need to exhibit all mentioned properties in order to be 
cognition. Certainly, in cases of minimal cognitive processing, it can 
contain only some of these properties. 
 I assume that cognition is based on the information processing 
process of problem-solving. This process should be context sensitive, 
rapidly adapting to new problems, and related to categorization and 
inhibition, but it not need be abstract or multimodal. We can also 
mention that it may not need to be representational. Here I follow some 
works of Keijzer and his colleagues (Keijzer 2003; van Duijn et al., 
2006), assuming that cognitive processing is problem-solving, embedded 
in sensorimotor coordination and interaction with the environment 
(Keijzer, 2003). I don’t reduce the whole cognition to sensorimotor 
coordination, but try to show that cognition is something primary 
related and submerged in this coordination. Some of this coordination 
requires solving some environmental and body complexity problems. 
Therefore, minimal cognition is a problem-solving process embedded in 
sensorimotor coordination. Of course, as cognition becomes more 
sophisticated, more elements from Buckner’s (2015) cluster should be 
included.  
 
1.2 Embodiment of the cognition 
It seems that what we, as theoreticians of the embodiment, should be 
particularly interested in is the extent to which the body, excluding the 
central nervous system, is part of the cognitive system (see the 
definition of embodied cognition in Wilson and Foglia [2011]). This is 
undoubtedly an important and by no means trivial question. However, in 
this paper, I focus on internal processing. As argued earlier in embodied 
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cognition cognitive processing, the base should extend beyond the 
central nervous system (Nowakowski, 2015). However, the body never 
independently performs cognitive processes but co-realizes cognition 
together with the central system (Nowakowski, 2017). Therefore, we 
deal here with a system characterized by a trade-off between what the 
peripheral nervous system and non-neuronal body parts do, and what 
the central system does. I defended the view that in many simpler 
systems peripheral systems play a greater role in base realizing 
cognition, whereas in the case of more complex systems (e.g. mammals) 
the central nervous system plays a greater role in cognition. Some 
authors (Fuchs 2011; Jacob, 2012; Gallagher et al. 2013), driven by the 
need of simplicity in cognitive processes, believed that one should 
conceptualize cognition as depending as much as possible on the 
peripheral system, whereas periphery should make cognitive processing 
simpler. Naturally, this will simplify the complexity of central processing. 
However, sometimes the simplest solution, in general, is to increase 
dependence on the central processing. There are possible types of 
embodiment where cognition relies mostly on central processing.   
 Here, I believe that we can connect this approach with Wilson 
and Golonka’s (2013) idea that “to explain cognition we should focus on a 
specific task and their sources used during the task.” Undoubtedly, 
among the resources an essential element is the central system; in the 
case of many animals, it’s the central nervous system and we should be 
able to show what this system really does. Therefore, in this context we 
can ask: How important is the brain as a resource for the bodily 
cognitive system or as a central processing machine? Even if an 
exhaustive answer is not available, we should be able to say what 
condition central processing should meet to be a part of the bodily 
cognitive system. I will return to this issue when discussing Goldman’s 
approach and my own proposal.  
 
1.3 Environment and Body Complexity Thesis 
In the literature we can find ideas very similar to the proposal in this 
paper. In his seminal work on the evolution of cognition, Godfrey-Smith 
(1996) defended the environmental complexity thesis:  
 
“Environmental complexity thesis (ECT): The function of 
cognition (and of a range of protocognitive capacities) is to 
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enable an agent to deal with environmental complexity.” 
(Godfrey-Smith, 2002, p.135).  
 
We can add that function is understood here as “the effect or capacity  
[…] responsible for […] success under a regime of natural selection” 
(Godfrey-Smith, 2002, p.135). And cognition is “a collection of capacities 
which, in combination, allow organisms to archive various kinds of 
adaptive coordination between their actions and the world”. (Godfrey-
Smith, 2002, p.135). Additionally, the environment is not only natural 
but also social. Therefore, such a cognitive system must also deal with 
the complex behavior of other living creatures.  
 Keijzer and Arnellos (2017) describe this view on the evolution of 
cognition as externalist, where it is shaped by environmental factors to 
which it is adapted. In response to Godfrey-Smith, they propose a more 
internalist approach, where not only environmental but also body 
complexity is important, especially when it comes to multicellular 
organisms with complex active bodies (see: Trestman, 2013). In these 
organisms, they see the importance of not only  input-output interaction 
between an organism and its environment but also the internal 
coordination of internal activity in complex multicellular systems 
(Keijzer, Arnellos, 2017). For this purpose, the authors propose the 
concept of the animal sensorimotor organization [ASMO]. They 
accentuate the “importance of the (internal) multicellular organization 
as a precondition for the macroscopic environment by animals to 
become accessible for these animals” (Keijzer, Arnellos, 2017). And it is 
important that ASMO “fulfils criteria for a minimal cognition” (Keijzer, 
Arnellos, 2017), and is compatible with our considerations from part 
(1.1).  For them ASMO includes: 
  
1. a multicellular body, constituting an ‘inner space’ or 
domain, which is differentiated from the body’s ‘outer 
space’ or environment.  
2. the presence of contractile epithelia. 
3. complex, standardized body architectures. 
4. sensitivity to tension and stress at the level of (intra) 
cellular processes. 
5. reversible, contraction-based changes in body-shape. 
(Keijzer, Arnellos, p.2017). 
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These conditions are really similar to the role of the body that I describe 
as constraining conditions (1.2.1).  The complex (multicellular) body 
system must learn its own properties to act and perceive. As we see, 
cognitive processing is here described in internalist terms (but not only 
internalist). To be able to cope with changing environmental problems, 
the system must first be able to coordinate its own stable and changing 
properties. So, the body is here not only something that enables an 
animal to perform particular actions—particular ways of dealing with 
environmental problems. The body, its complexity and coordination is 
also a problem which must be solved in order to cope with 
environmental problems. Therefore, even if there are differences 
between the external and internal (bodily) environments, the animal 
must coordinate both. Therefore, according to our initial considerations, 
we should notice that if we consider embodied cognition as the role of 
cognition for a particular body, we should think of not only the issue of 
environmental complexity but also of bodily complexity. This leads us to 
more detailed remarks on cognition and embodiment.  
 
1.3 Toward internal processing in bodily cognitive systems 
In the previous parts of this paper, I proposed that in embodied 
cognition cognition is construed by some kind of a minimal cluster, 
mainly embedded in sensorimotor coordination problem-solving 
processes. The body is here described as a whole organism, inducing an 
important tradeoff between the central and peripheral systems. Then I 
showed that the brain is not self-sufficient. I finished with remarks on 
one of the most interesting views on embodied cognition.  
 From this, we can see that any view of embodied cognition 
should include an account of internal, cognitive processing2. Even if it 
extends to some body parts going beyond the central nervous system or 
even some morphological and dynamic properties of the physical body. 
This processing is, then, highly integrated with the functioning of the 
whole body and solves the problem raised by body features. It also 
                                                 
2 It is important to show that the model of cognitive processing in question is 
appropriate for a system with specific bodily features, so that it is a model of 
embodied cognitive processing. 
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exploits some of them to solve some of the problems raised by the 
environment.  
 Now, we can look in more detail at the internal processing itself. 
Here I defend the embodied theory of cognition and show that it is 
necessary to propose a special approach to internal processing. I will 
start my consideration by discussing one of the most interesting 
approaches to this processing. After presenting some of the limitations 
of this proposal I will develop an alternative approach. 
   
2. Goldman on B-codes and embodied cognition 
It is not easy to say what a good theory of internal cognitive processing 
in embodied cognition should look like. Here I choose one—even if it is 
not the most widely accepted, it is undoubtedly one of the most 
interesting proposals: Alvin Goldman’s moderate approach to embodied 
cognition and his idea of B-codes, which embody cognition. 
 
2.1 Moderate approach to embodied cognition 
Goldman in his papers (2012; 2014) makes a distinction between a 
question of the embodiment of cognition in general and the 
embodiment of a particular cognitive token or exemplar. This distinction 
seems to be innocent but it is not.3 I believe that most of the more 
philosophically oriented research is about a general type of embodiment 
of cognition (see: Shapiro, 2004; Wilson, Foglia, 2011), but most of 
psychological work is related to a token or exemplar type of embodiment 
of cognition. In this context, Goldman (2012; 2014) is an interesting 
exception because he is interested in embodied tokens or exemplars. 
This makes his approach more compatible with psychological than 
philosophical works on embodiment. As already mentioned, in the 
context of Shapiro’s (2010) distinction regarding the relation between 
embodied and traditional views on cognition, Goldman proposes a 
moderate approach of embodiment, which is in line with traditional 
research, and refuses the need of any replacement. 
                                                 
3 I think it is right to point out similarities between the distinction, present in works 
about consciousness, between creature consciousness and state consciousness. In 
this case creature consciousness is analogous to embodied cognition in general, 
and state consciousness is analogous to embodied tokens or exemplars.  
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 Surprisingly, Goldman also argues that if we describe embodied 
cognition as a role of the physical body in cognition, we will trivialize 
this idea. He agrees that when we close our eyes4 it has an impact on 
seeing, but says that this is trivial and we cannot base our research on 
such influence of the body on cognition. I believe and try to show in this 
paper that, on the one hand, it’s impossible to reduce the role of the 
physical body in cognition to closing eyes or putting fingers in the ears, 
on the other, that there are non-trivial accounts of the role of the 
physical body in cognition.  
 
2.2 On B-codes and their re-use 
Goldman’s approach is based on two ideas. The first one is the idea of the 
bodily codes or bodily formats. This idea comes from the paper co-
authored with Frederique de Vignemont (Goldman, de Vignemont, 
2009). The second one is the idea of “reuse”, borrowed from the works 
of Michael Anderson.  
 The most recent form of Goldman’s definition of embodied 
cognition is as follows: 
 
Cognition (token) C is a specimen of embodied cognition if 
and only if C uses some (internal) bodily format5 to help 
execute a cognitive task (whenever the task may be) 
(Goldman, 2014, p.102). 
 
To understand this definition, we need to understand the B-codes and 
how a system uses these formats to “execute cognitive tasks”.   
                                                 
4 This example, taken from Goldman papers (2012; and with de Vignemont, 2009), 
only seems to be trivial but is really interesting. A system with eyes which can be 
closed could have eyes built of a more fragile and sensitive material, and they could 
also simply have bigger eyes. A system able to close eyes should have the ability to 
rapidly update information, taking into account the difference between signals 
before and after closing eyes. Such a system should integrate visual information 
with tactile or proprioceptive information for smooth movement coordination in 
short periods without visual information. Therefore, the fact that I close my eyes is 
not fundamental for embodied cognition. However, the fact that our eyes can close 
and open possibly has a big influence on the way we process visual information.  
5 Although, Goldman uses the terms B-codes and B-formats interchangeably, I only 
use the term B-code. 
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2.2.1 B-codes 
In his earlier paper, Goldman (2012) writes that code is something 
which is “language-like, […] has a distinctive vocabulary, syntax, and a set 
of computational procedures” (Goldman, 2012, p.73). In his proposal, 
every sense modality has its own code, and some even have many codes, 
as in the case of visual perception for action and recognition (Milner, 
Goodale, 1995). Bodily formats are here described as formats which “in 
the mind/brain represent states of the subject’s own body, indeed, 
represent them from an internal perspective” (Goldman, 2012, p.73). 
This is interpreted to mean that bodily formats represent the body 
through interception, proprioception, and by other somatosensory 
modalities. However, Goldman describes it neither in detail, nor in terms 
of syntax, nor computational procedures. We can only say that the syntax 
and procedures are somatosensory-specific. So we can assume that 
bodily formats are, to put it widely, somatosensory, internal body 
representations, primarily involved in body control and representations.  
 This idea needs more specification. Even if somatosensory, 
auditory, and visual areas differ from each other and have a distinctive 
organization (e.g. primary somatosensory cortex is organized 
somatotopically), at the bottom all neurons work in quite a similar way. 
For Goldman, codes are distinguished by their connections with separate 
areas of the brain. B-codes are performed by areas which process 
information about the body. Of course, there could be many B-codes – 
there are probably nociceptive, tactile discriminatory and affective codes, 
and also proprioceptive codes. But what is their nature? In visual 
perception, the vision-for-action (dorsal) and vision-for-recognition 
(ventral) streams have differing codes just because one is related to the 
ventral and the other to the dorsal stream. Prima facie it sounds 
convincing – action coordination and object identification should be 
executed by distinct computational procedures. However, this difference 
is one thing, the nature of these codes being the source of the difference 
is another.  
 It’s possible that this situation is caused by the fact that Goldman 
is mainly interested in using (actually: reusing) these codes in order to 
explain cognition, not the brain.   
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2.2.2 Reuse of B-codes 
If Goldman remained interested only in theories of representing and 
processing information about own body, his approach would be 
extremely limited. However, he argues that “Embodied cognition is a 
significant and pervasive sector of human cognition” (Goldman, 2012, 
p.81).  Therefore, he introduces an extension of this theory by adding 
that: “B-formats are massively redeployed or reused for many other 
cognitive tasks...” (Goldman, 2012, p. 81).  
 Based on the results of studies on the activity of the central 
nervous system, it is argued that a specific type of cognitive activity is 
embodied (Caramazza et al., 2014; Meteyard et al., 2012; Kubanek, 
Snyder, 2015). This research indicates that the same areas of the central 
nervous system are active in the exercise of control tasks as well as in 
the monitoring of the state of the body and in performing non-related-
to-body cognitive tasks. It is not possible to discuss even a small portion 
of these studies, and, additionally, it doesn't seem to be necessary. We 
will only use two examples of such research to illustrate the general 
characteristics of this kind of approach. Goldman (2012; 2014) refers to 
Pullvemuller’s (2005) papers on the connection between language and 
action, to Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) work on mirror neurons, and to 
Proffitt and colleagues (2008; 2012) on the role of action and body 
representations in spatial perception. Because of controversies6 in his 
later papers, Goldman (2016) admitted that Proffitt’s research cannot be 
used in his research on B-codes so I will not refer to this research here. 
 Pulvermuller (2005) relates motor activation to language 
comprehension. He argues that the motor cortex has somatotopic 
organization. If language is embodied, then comprehension of action-
related words or sentences should also have an effect on somatotopic 
activation. As Goldman writes (2014, p.96-97), we can observe such 
activation.  
 
                                                 
6 The key point of Proffitt's approach (that is the relationship between the 
physiological state of the organism and the perception of the steepness of the 
terrain) was called into question (Durgin et al., 2012; Shaffer et al., 2013). 
Additionally, Firestone and Scholl (2014) argued that Proffitt's whole concept was 
based on El Greco fallacy. 
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Hearing different sentences involving lick, pick, and kick 
activated motor areas that control the tongue, the fingers, 
and the leg, respectively (Goldman, 2014, p.97). 
  
According to Goldman’s approach, if B-codes are involved in motor 
control and the only criterion for the distinction is the brain area, then 
Pulvermuller’s research is an example of the reuse of motoric B-codes for 
language comprehension.  
 Goldman’s work complements Michael Anderson’s (2007; 2010) 
research on massive redeployment. This approach is based on several 
theses: (a) in the evolution of the nervous system, old components, if 
only possible, are reused for new purposes; (b) the same circuits or 
areas in “different arrangements” i.e., in connection with separate areas 
are employed for separate tasks, (c) phylogenetically earlier areas are 
widely connected and more often used for separate task realization. 
Therefore, areas phylogenetically earlier are the best candidates for 
being related to B-codes reused later in other not-related-to-body 
cognitive tasks.  
 We can now wrap up. The central system uses various B-codes to 
represent the body, and it reuses these codes to solve problems not 
related to the body. It seems that the relation to the body is not really so 
important for Goldman. It is important insofar as we need to distinguish 
B-codes from other codes. So this is really a weak kind of embodiment, 
which tells us nothing about dealing with the body and environment 
complexity.   
  
2.3 From criticism of B-codes to E-codes 
Goldman’s approach is as interesting as it is controversial. Gallagher 
points out that in this context there is no real important role for the body 
itself (Gallagher 2015a; 2015b). In the same vein, Kyselo and di Paolo 
(2015) write that Goldman’s approach is too narrow, and does not 
include the body’s real role in cognition. But the most interesting 
remarks are in Firestone’s paper (2016), who shows that Goldman’s use 
of Anderson’s re-use conception is problematic in the case of vision. To 
be precise, vision can’t be embodied in circuits responsible for grasping, 
because eyes evolved earlier than hands. Goldman (2016) accepted this 
critique and accepted that his theory doesn't explain the embodiment of 
vision. Therefore, in Goldman’s approach, visual perception is not 
Przemysław R. Nowakowski 
Embodied Cognition: Looking Inward 
[86] 
embodied. It’s a really surprising result, and it’s worth remembering, 
that if vision is in fact embodied, then it is an argument against 
Goldman’s approach. 
 There is one more critic, important for this paper. At the end of 
his remarks about Goldman’s (2012) approach, Shapiro (2014) directs 
attention to a very interesting issue. Why can we say that B-codes 
provide a good account of embodied cognition? More accurately, why are 
B-codes good in terms of being reused for cognition? Goldman describes 
B-codes as bodily because they primarily represent the body. But, as 
Shapiro notices, this is not enough as Goldman doesn't give any reason 
why they are good for reuse for cognitive purposes. This is, in my 
opinion, a crucial issue related to Goldman’s approach to embodied 
cognition, and, as Shapiro writes, it “should not be overlooked and is one 
that places the burden on Goldman to justify his claim that any reuse of 
B-codes suffices to embody cognition” (Shapiro, 2014, p.87-88). If B-
codes are individuated by their primary role of representing the body, 
and then they are reused because of other reasons, it seems doubtful 
that we should still maintain that this is embodiment in B-codes. 
 Further, in this paper I propose a solution which is not dependent 
on any appeal to the representation of the body.  
 
3. E-codes: Internal processing beyond B-codes 
Here I want to sketch some ideas about an alternative to Goldman’s view 
on internal processing in embodied cognition. I call it E-codes, because it 
is coding and processing information embedded in the whole bodily 
system, and it should be able to give the system the ability to deal with 
the risk and uncertainty that it must deal with in everyday conditions 
(see: epigraph at the beginning of this paper). Therefore, contrary to 
Goldman, I’m interested mainly in an embodiment of cognition in 
general, not an embodiment of a particular cognitive token or exemplar. 
 
3.1 E-codes: general outline 
Embodied cognition need not be a kind of cognition primarily related to 
the body or about the body. It is essential to consider two types of 
properties of E-codes: body-specific and body-general. Body-specific 
properties of E-code are shaped by particular properties of the body. 
Even if in almost all living organisms their building blocks are quite 
similar, their structure and organization are quite different. Systems 
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different in size, morphology, sensors, and effectors solve problems of 
internal coordination and efficient action in the environment in 
individual ways. Therefore, cognitive processing differs among them. 
Body-general properties are also shaped by the body but are related to 
properties present in all living creatures (energy consumption, dealing 
with risk and uncertainty). I must point out that the research presented 
here wasn’t developed as research on embodied cognitive processing. It 
was developed quite independently, but is essential for studies about 
embodied cognition.  
 As I argued earlier, cognitive processing is probably, at least 
partially, extended beyond the central cognitive nervous system (see: 
Nowakowski, 2015). However, no matter whether this processing 
extends beyond the central system or not, it should have some 
properties. In this part of my paper, I try to indicate the kind of 
properties they should be. 
 My solution is partially inspired by Keijzer’s (2015) research on 
the evolution of the nervous system as a process of development – a 
sophistication of a specialized control system. This system is engaged 
not only in solving problems of interaction with the environment but 
also internal coordination of neural and muscular tissue activity (see 
part 1.3). So, we deal here with the problem of efficient action and 
internal coordination. I describe this as a process of the system 
“learning” of its properties, possibilities, and constraints. In the context 
of such processes cognitive systems emerge.  
  Even if there is not much research on this topic, I can show some 
body-specific and body-general properties of E-codes:  
 a. The laziness of E-codes: Haselager and colleagues (2008) argue 
for the lazy brain hypothesis, where the brain in dealing with problems 
is not searching for the best solution but trying to use the easiest, most 
accessible, most preferable solutions. Therefore, it’s trying to choose the 
“cheapest”, often biased, way to solve the problem. In a similar vein, Clark 
argues for productive laziness, that cognitive processing should be based 
on “economic but effective strategies and heuristics” (Clark, 2015, 
p.244). 
 b. Organization and robustness of E-codes: Our considerations are 
related to the possible evolution of the whole bodily system. Even though 
I don’t accept Goldman’s approach in its entirety, I assume that 
Anderson’s idea of reuse is compatible with E-codes. The evolved system 
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reuses in any way available subsystems developed earlier. This can be 
connected to the possible nested organization of a nervous, cognitive 
system (Bolt et al., 2017). To some degree, we can connect this proposal 
to a more general idea of degeneracy (more than one subsystem serves a 
particular function) and redundancy (one subsystem serves more than 
one function). Such an organization of a cognitive system can increase its 
robustness and effectiveness7.  
 c. Cost effectiveness of E-codes: Laughlin (2001) and Niven (2016) 
argue that energy consumption by the nervous system is a relevant 
constraint on information processing by the brain. Therefore, brain size, 
number of connections between neurons, and tradeoffs in processing 
between the central and peripheral systems are determined by energy 
consumption. E-codes should be organized in the most energetically 
economical available way for efficient, fast signaling and minimization of 
energy consumption at the same time. Wang and Clandinin argue that 
wiring economy is a significant determinant of nervous system layout 
(Wang, Clandinin, 2016, p.R1101) 
 d. Prospectivness of E-codes: We can also say, in the context of the 
motto of this paper, that such bodily systems are almost constantly 
exposed to the risk of being cheated, injured, or even dying. They must 
constantly anticipate possible changes in the environment and in their 
internal milieu. Of course, every system should be anticipatory to some 
degree. This property can be connected with contemporary works on 
integration between embodied cognition and predictive processing (see: 
de Bruin, Michael, 2017; Allen, Friston, 2016; Bruineberg, Kiverstein, 
Rietveld, 2016; Burr, Jones, 2016). However, there are still controversies 
about the nature of this integration. 
 
And we can describe some body-specific properties of E-codes:  
 e. E-codes and body size and shape: Organisms of varying sizes 
and motor flexibility need individual control systems and individual 
computational procedures (see: Hooper, 2012), various systems to 
differing degrees offload control on dynamical and mechanical 
properties of the controlled system. 
                                                 
7 These properties can be increased by balanced (excitation/inhibitory) activation of 
network and top-down feedback (see: Denève et al., 2017)  
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 f. E-codes and sensorimotor specificity: Organisms with individual 
sensors need individual solutions for effective processing of available 
sensory information (see: MacIver, 2009). Each individual visual system 
will need separate kinds of internal processing. An octopus with human 
eyes will be blind, but for humans seeing with a mantis shrimp eye will 
be computationally intractable (see: Nowakowski, 2017) 
 g. E-codes and various solutions for general problems: In reference 
to point 3, we can say that in individual organisms (e.g. with individual 
body size/brain size ratio), individual solutions for frugal processing are 
needed. 
 
As we can see, we don’t refer to representing or experiencing the body. 
We don’t say what bodies mostly do, only what cognition does for the 
body, and how it is shaped by the body. But I believe this is the most 
convincing view on embodied cognition. In our proposal, we describe 
the embodiment of cognition as an element of the emergence of 
cognition in the process of effectively coping with the body and with 
environment complexity. 
 We can also answer the questions posed in the introduction. It’s 
highly unlikely that B-codes, as described by Goldman, are examples of E-
codes. However, if they have to be useful, they should have the properties 
of E-codes.  
  
Conclusion 
Embodied cognition is currently facing problems (Goldinger et al., 2016), 
so we should search for conceptualizations that are more consistent 
with the embodiment thesis but that are also consistent with the 
empirical data. I hope the E-coding approach presented here gives such 
an opportunity. However, I believe it needs more comparative meta-
analysis and computational modeling than psychological experiments, 
because if cognition is embodied in the way described in this paper, we 
should observe the correlation between various body morphologies and 
the various kinds of cognitive processing employed in problem-solving.  
 If the solution proposed here is correct, it gives the opportunity 
to develop an account of the “embodied cognitive architectures”. We 
should not forget that embodied cognition is a theory of cognition, not of 
the body. Cognition in beings able to take risk, [...] and [beings] exposed 
to the unknown. 
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ABSTRACT 
EMBODIED COGNITION: LOOKING INWARD 
The body is a highly complex, coordinated system engaged in coping 
with many environmental problems. It can be considered as some sort of 
opportunity or obstacle, with which internal processing must deal. 
Internal processing must take into account the possibilities and 
limitations of the particular body. In other words, even if the body is not 
involved in the realization of some cognitive explicit task, it is not a 
neutral factor of our understanding of why a system solves a task in one 
way or another. Therefore, when conducting research on embodiment 
and the body’s cognitive system we should not neglect internal, cognitive 
processing.  
 I appeal to Goldman’s research on embodied cognition to sketch 
the broader framework for internal processing in embodied cognition. I 
believe that even if we don’t accept Goldman’s approach as the viable 
proposal for embodied cognition in general, it’s a quite natural starting 
point for our analysis. Goldman (2012; 2014, and with de Vignemont 
2009) argue for the essential role of the bodily formats or bodily codes 
(respectively: B-formats and B-codes) in embodied cognition. B-codes 
are here described as the processing of regions or sub-regions of the 
central nervous system. They are primarily employed for body control or 
monitoring, and reused for cognitive tasks.  Beyond doubt, this 
conception provides an excellent starting point for analyzing the internal 
(mostly neural) processing in cases of embodied cognition.  
 At the end of this paper, I will argue that the embodiment of 
cognition needs a conceptual twist. Following Keijzer’s (2015) interest in 
the evolution of the nervous system, and the minimal forms of cognition, 
I argue that in investigating embodied cognition, we should investigate 
the role played by cognitive processing for specific kinds of organisms, 
meaning organisms with a body of a particular morphology (size, shape, 
kinds, and distribution of sensors and effectors). Doing that, I refer to 
some conceptual and empirical considerations. I will also try to show 
that research on embodied cognition is still not sufficiently anchored in 
evolutionary and comparative studies on cognition, nor on the nervous 
system and body morphology. Bigger reliance on these kinds of studies, 
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will make it make possible to gain a deeper understanding of internal 
processing in embodied cognition.  
KEYWORDS: embodied cognition; bodily cognitive system; internal and 
cognitive processing; B-codes; E-codes 
 
 
